It is an investment because costs are incurred, both explicit, in the form of fees, and implicit, in the form of "hardship", as well as opportunity cost of staying in school while the individual could begin his career. Like most of studies in Economics, the optimal choice is dependent on the balance between benefits and costs. There is an additional element in the study of this cost and benefit of investment in human capital, that of private versus social cost and benefit. As the terms imply, the former pertain to the individual agent's personal cost in terms of hardship (which is a function of their innate talent), and opportunity cost (which is a function of personal network, and opportunities available at any given time). The latter pertains to the optimal choice if there was one individual who could make a binding choice for everyone of us. This simplifies the model to a comparison between total benefit in terms of income stream, and cost of education. That is we do not model the hardship element in staying in school. Further note that agents here are homogenous, i.e. one agent is no different from another. Or at least, we are comparing one type of agent at a time. Why? Well, since all we are concerned with is the mechanism that directs an individual's choice, there is no gain in adding that additional level of complication.
What does this theory predict?
To consider individuals of other types, who might find higher educational attainment easier, or another who might find it more difficult, may easily be factored by including a constant term to the direct cost element. β However, he faces the cost of not quitting, and staying in school. Let the cost of school fees be where E is "high" for high school graduate, and "college" is for college graduate. Then his net benefit from staying in school is, At graduation from high school, he faces a similar problem, one that might be similar to your considerations when you choose to start your undergraduate stint in StFX. His projected income stream and net benefit are Of course if we extend our argument beyond a single type of individual, it just means that the net benefit for a high type individual is greater by virtue of perhaps a steeper, and higher income profile after college. Of course, that is on the assumption he does not embark on the PhD route! Why? If having a PhD increases the income profile substantially, why don't we see more individuals choosing to pursue PhD?
Another Model
Can we model this mechanism in any other manner? Consider the following general model. Let the benefit of staying in school be ( )
, where e is the number of years of education, and p is the type of individual. Where B is increasing and concave in e, which implies that although more years of education is better for an individual, the marginal gains from an additional year eventually starts falling. 
Education and Market Equilibrium
In a labor market, differing firms required labor of differing quality and skill, and hence differing levels of education. Note that in this depiction, as the isoprofit moves towards the south east, they are on higher isoprofit curves, since they are paying lower wages, and yet getting labor of increasing skills. An example of this differentiation is between the requirements for a Corporate Banker, and a subway train driver. Note the difference in the marginal rate of substitution between a high type individual who is more inclined to have more education, and low type individuals who are not. For the latter type, a larger wage increase is required to entice them into greater number of years of education.
→ → Note also that high type firms are more inclined / prepared to paying higher wages for the additional years of education. In a competitive equilibrium, firms earn zero profit. This then mean that the "hull" formed by the isoprofit curves constitutes the employers' offer curve, showing the maximum wages that can be paid for various levels of education. Note the following points; o Labor with more education enjoy a compensating differential (for the difference in the amount of years of education). This is dependent on the preferences of different types of workers, the distribution of these different types of workers, which determines the firms' choice of staff, and the technology used in production. o Employers with the different preferences for differing types of employees, are matched with those employees. This equilibrium is pareto optimal. Note an important caveat: This assumes education is fully revealing, and representative of the abilities a firm needs, i.e. there is no asymmetry in information.
So what do we want to verify with data:
Estimating the returns to Schooling
The typical method of estimating the rate of return to schooling uses data on the earnings (such as annual income) and schooling of different workers and estimates the percentage wage difference associated with one more year of What are some problems with this regression: T choices they make. But our priors suggests th differ on some level, let it be "ability" that is perhaps genetically transmitted, then the error in our estimation suffers from endogeniety, i.e. our "ability" in the errors is systematically correlated with our schooling variable s. So what's the big deal then? Let a be our ability, such that the relationship between a and s is as follows:
and what we are really interested in is
But because a is not observable, our actual regression is actually: We could always compare apples to apples. That is use a "Natural Experiment", where we perform the above regression on then have similar ability. How does it work? Take a pair of twins, run the similar regression by on the difference in income against difference in schooling. Because they were born of same parents, ability "a" will get cancelled out. And all our assumptions are met. Or does it? The results has been mixed (See Borjas). But why when the method seems so appealing and intuitive? Well consider this, if their abilities are the same, why do they differ in their choice but because they differ in their discount rates. But why do they differ in discount rates, but because there is still something unobservable, and we are back to square one. 3.
Angrist and Krueger (1992) (Read Borjas page 251 for reference) estimated the above equation using Instrumental Variables regressio natural experiment that the Vietnam war created. The estimate they got was that an additional year of schooling raised income by 7%. Another example of using Instrumental Variables was also performed by Angrist and Krueger (1991) (Again read Borjas for specifics) where they used compulsory schooling which ECON 361 effectively forced everyone to stay in school regardless of ability until a specific age, which depends on the year we are considering, and state the sample was from. Then individuals who remain past the law are of one ability, and those who dropout are of another. chooling is that impor 2. If s tant, and may level the playing field, why don't we spend more money on the public schooling system since their may be social quality of our schools, and hence raising the rate of return to schooling? Card
Do
Doesn't point 1 answer this question? Well, not exactly. Point 1 assumes that our e mechanism that goes on within Educat s assumed that education raises a worker's productivity, and hence e warrants higher wages the longer an individual stays in school. We now an alternative
gains.
The next question then is whether dumping money into school system enhance the and Krueger (1992) found evidence that school quality was positively correlated with rate of return to schooling. Borjas gives a summary in section 7.7 in his book. There has also been mixed results in this area, see particularly Hanushek.
workers really maximize lifetime earnings?
basic model is correct, we do not know the tru the mind of the individual unless we can see how he reacts under differing circumstances, in this case offerings of differing lifetime income stream. But we cannot perform this ideal experiment, since no individual can rescind a choice he has made. Even if he did, he would have been at a different age from when his initial decision was observed. What this means is that even if we could track an individual's choice, the choice the individual makes is dependent as before on both observables and unobservables, and their will be selection bias since an individual of any particular "type" who make their choice conditional on his "type". The technique used is generally called "Selection Bias Correction" (2 stage estimation methods. To see more details refer to Borjas.). Results using these techniques has found that our theory is correct, i.e. that individuals make their choices conditioning on their ability or "type", and there is hence no one "type" of individual. Then the differential in wages paid is a culmination of differential in demand, and length of schooling required for those task for which individuals are hired. Or does it?
ion as a Filter
Our previous study ha th where education does not augment an individuals skill set, but is just a sorting mechanism for individuals of greater levels of "intelligence" from individuals with a lower endowment of it. This works if and only if a potential employer cannot discern between the true type of the individual, i.e. that is asymmetry of information between employers (referred to as Principals) and workers (agents).
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A sketch of the model: 1. Let there be two types of workers, indexed by h for high type, and l for low type. Let there be a unit mass of all workers, and that of this q are of the former type, and 1-q are of the latter. The former commands a higher lifetime stream of income, y h , and the latter commands y l . 2. If all employers could discern between all the worker types, they would offer each type their respective incomes. Thus the justification for our assumption of asymmetry on information between the agents and the principals. The idea is as follows: How can we sort this different types of workers such that they would reveal themselves, since there is no incentive for the l type individuals to reveal themselves to you. Put another way, l type individuals would be inclined to lie so that he gains the higher wage rate or income. Assuming no punishment for lying, and that it takes time for employers to discover an individuals true type. 3. One possible choice if the principal cannot discern between the types, and barring any other information, the principal would choose to offer a weighted or average income for both h and l type. Then the income is
So what are some implications? a. l type individuals would prefer this outcome since they gain a higher level of income. b. Neither the principal nor the h type individual would like this since h type are now paid less, and the principal would find that he is mismatching worker task to type, and the firm would be working at sub-optimal efficiency. 4. What can be done? Well, if there is a form of signal that would provide the separation that is required, we would be able to offer the right wage to the correct type. Here's where number of years of schooling comes in. Let the cost of the number of years of schooling be a constant where t indexes the individuals type. Further, we need to assume that the h type individuals have a lower cost to schooling. What the principal wants is to find the number of years of schooling which the l type would find not beneficial to him given his type, and he would consequently reveal his type by the amount of schooling he chooses.
Where is the minimum or reservation level of education that the principal must use to induce revelation of the individual's type. Note that the greater the differential between the incomes offered to the two types, the greater would the minimum schooling has to be. However this is only part of the story. The principal would have to ensure that the h type individual would actually choose to exceed the requirements. That is Diagrammatically, this simple model is illustrated above, where * E is the efficient education cutoff choice. Note that at * E the low type are better off revealing their true type then lying about their capabilities. While at ' the benefits in the form of wages are high enough such that low type would find it beneficial to lie.
E
The above model can also be considered from the point of view where different individuals have different preferences towards education, and hence the amount of compensation they require to be on a higher indifference curve. 
On Job Training and the Age Earnings Profile
We thus far considered human capital investment from the perspective of education. However, job training is not pertinent to youths prior to entry into the labor force. As technology evolves labor has to constantly retrain to maintain there relevancy.
There are two types of On-Job-Training:
1. General Training: This form of training is not task specific, and enhances the value of the worker anywhere with any firm he finds himself with. Example: Programming skill in Java, HTML, and C+ and C++ are transferable skills in any firm requiring a programmer. 2. Specific Training: This form of training are firm and/or task specific, and may be relevan industry only, i.e. it is not an easily transferable skill. Example: Learning how to use SAP is useless if the firm uses are client software in monitoring their production, and inventory. Consider a simple model where a firm is contractually hired for only two periods, after which the worker retires. The firm of course continues to exist. Let it be such that the firm only hires new labor after retiring the current worker. Hiring is instantaneous, and have t to a firm or there is no lag. The profit maximizing choice of this firm is then derived from the following problem; firm needs to train all employees in the first period while they are on the tion needs to be augmented with this cost, as well as the fact that the more productive in the second period after training. Le
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If however the job, the condi employees are t the marginal cost of training be labor is just w worker with sufficiently hig O and that this cost is incurred only in period 1, and the marginal cost of ages. Further, let the labor market be competitive, so that after training, the a higher skill may sort employment elsewhere if the wage offer is h, that is the wages may be different. The condition is now;
Who pays for training:
1. General Training: As noted, general training is transferable. This then mean that the skills are beneficial to both the employee, and the employer. Let's use backward induction: a. In the second period, because the skills are perfectly transferable, let the as to pay the worker this competitive i h is e va f the marginal product of labor in the second period, else because the skill is transferable, they would choose to leave if a better offer arrives. what if the firm makes the worker pay for the training. The ence the answer. If the two share threat of leaving by the worker credible as long as the wage offered is slightly above the going wage should he leave the firm?) Case 2: But worker would then incur a lower actual wage in the first period, and reap the rewards in the second period. However, the firm can threaten to renege on the deal, and pay below the value of marginal product in the second period, or even dismiss the worker. (The fear of being dismissed is in truth not a problem since the firm cannot credibly commit to making that move since it can always make a positive gain by retaining the worker because the value of marginal product is greater.) c. Case 3: The hints in brackets give in ess in the cost and benefits, the threat of quitting and dismissal becomes not credible. Suppose the general skill of the worker in each period warrants a wage of w. Then the firm can simply pay a wage higher then that, say R w , but lower than the value of marginal product of labor in the second period. In such a case, the worker would never consider quitting. So the firm's share of the gain is . Note that this means in equilibrium, the workers are paid a wage lower than the going wage while training, and a higher than going wage after training. Your text has a diagrammatic representation on page 276.
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Mincer Earni
Our examinat s in a age-earning profile for individuals earning profile where w is the years in the la equation abov coefficients ha tation; a is the p additional year he percentage ch year of experience. The latter is typically interpreted as the impact of on-job-training.
ngs Function ion of human capital model culminate . Jacob Mincer in fact showed that the human capital model generates an ageof the form DX ct bt as w + − + = 2 log worker's wage, s is the number of years of schooling, t is the number of bor market (experience), and X is the set of other pertinent variables. The e is typically referred to as the Mincer Earnings Function. The regression s the following interpre ercentage change in wages for an of schooling, and t is t ange in wages due to an additional
